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NSC BRIEFING

3 March 1954

MIDDLE EAST REACTIONS TO TURKISH-PAKISTANI
DEFENSE PLANS

BACKGROUND

1. Nehru to Ambassador Allen, 24

February: "I have never at any moment...had any thought whatsoever that US government, and least of all President Eisenhower, wished to do any damage to India."

2. Nehru to parliament, 1 March: "What

is more important (than differences between US and Indian policies towards Communist China) is that a responsible official of the US government (Assistant Secretary of State Robertson) should say it is their policy that the US must dominate Asia for an indefinite period. Whatever the objective may be, the countries of Asia, and certainly India, do not accept this policy and do not propose to be dominated by any country for whatever purpose."

State Dept. review completed

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3. Nehru on US observers in Kashmir:

"The military aid being given by the United States to Pakistan is a form of intervention in these problems (Kashmir), which is likely to have more far-reaching results than previous types of intervention."

"At the present moment there is a considerable number of American observers attached to the UN team on either side of the 'cease fire' line in Jammu and Kashmir state. These American observers can no longer be treated by us as neutrals in this dispute and hence their presence appears to us to be improper."

4. Egyptian press, 22 February: Turkish-Pakistani agreement is a "new imperialist attempt to drag Middle East countries into a war in which they have no interest."

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5. Israeli press, 23 February: "...new pact must be seen as achievement of Turkish diplomacy.... Adhesion of Iraq would entirely change complexion of matter as far as Israel is concerned. Israel cannot possibly reconcile herself to military strengthening of country which refused to sign armistice agreement with her and which through recent statements and acts demonstrates hatred against Israel."

6. Moscow radio, 23 February:
"Preparations for the conclusion of a Turkish-Pakistani pact are in progress at the order of US aggressive circles and with their effective support. US aggressive circles have cast their greedy eyes on the strategic raw materials, military bases, and human cannon fodder in this region."

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I. Summary Statement

- A. Middle East press reactions to Turkish-Pakistani defense talks and grant of US military aid to Pakistan generally unfavorable.
- B. Official reactions, however, varied from favorable in Iraq to hostile in India.
- C. Arab states' comment sparse due preoccupation crisis in Egypt and Syria.
- D. Israel suspicious development might eventually strengthen Arabs; Iran interested but noncommittal.
- E. Reactions in Turkey and Pakistan enthusiastic.

II. South Asia

A. India

- 1. Nehru's private reaction to

Ambassador Allen on 24 February

surprisingly mild.

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2. Speech of 1 March, however, tirade
against American policy in Asia.
 - a. Rejected Eisenhower's military aid
offer India as "unworthy" of US.
 - b. Announced India no longer
recognizes neutrality of 32
American members UN observers team
in Kashmir and their presence
"improper."

3.



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4. Foreign Office spokesman says US aid
for Pakistan probably not affect
India's acceptance US economic aid.
Indian 1954-55 budget announced 27
February anticipates \$94,500,000
foreign aid; FOA preliminary 1954-55
program \$115,000,000.

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B. Pakistan

1. Enthusiasm nearly unanimous, emphasizing receipt American military aid rather than talks with Turkey.
2. Pakistan may be taking more careful look at Turkish agreement since US aid announced, but agreement not in jeopardy.

C. Afghanistan

1. Afghan government privately indicated desire join pact, if US guarantees Afghanistan's frontiers.
2. Publicly announced 1 March favorable view pact after long press campaign against.

III. Arab States

A. Egypt and Syria

1. Anticipatory press comments hostile, seeing talks as plot break up Arab front.

2. Now preoccupied by domestic crises
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B. Lebanon

1. Announcements overshadowed by Egyptian and Syrian crisis; sparse comment mildly favorable.

C. Saudi Arabia

1. Disapproves agreements which would detract from Arab unity; no other comment.

D. Iraq

1. Prime Minister Jamali indicated desire join pact; announced would make alliances regardless other Arab states.
2. Press and popular opinion hostile.

IV. Others

A. Iran

1. Interested but recognizes conditions unfavorable Iranian action.

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B. Israel

1. Comment cautious. Israel fears strengthening Iraq. Press, however, praised Turkish statesmanship.

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